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Note 
It’s the Autonomy, Stupid: Political Data-Mining 
and Voter Privacy in the Information Age 
Chris Evans* 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine American democracy without the secret ballot. 
Candidates could effectively bribe and otherwise coerce voters. 
Voters themselves would feel social pressure to vote against 
dissenters and unpopular ideas. Minority viewpoints would 
struggle to gain traction. Such was the state of elections in the 
United States through most of the nineteenth century, prior to 
widespread adoption of the secret ballot.1 By the turn of the 
twentieth century, Progressives had successfully advocated for 
introduction of the secret ballot “to enhance citizen independ-
ence and sincerity by freeing voters to vote their actual prefer-
ences rather than those of a party to which they felt beholden 
or that they feared.”2 In theory, voters would be free to exercise 
their basic democratic right autonomously and out of view of 
the party bosses.3 
Information Age political tactics are unraveling the ano-
nymity afforded by the secret ballot. To more effectively target 
voters, campaigns have become voracious collectors of personal 
data.4 Databases operated by the major political parties as well 
                                                          
© 2012 Chris Evans 
 *  J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School. Chris would like 
to thank Professor McGeveran for his guidance and the editors and staff of the 
Journal for their improvements to this Note. 
 1. James A. Gardner, Anonymity and Democratic Citizenship, 19 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS J. 927, 943 (2011) (“The principal justification for introducing 
the secret ballot, a reform backed strongly by Progressives, was to break the 
control that parties were thought to exercise over voters by depriving them of 
the ability to enforce discipline at the polls.”). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See, e.g., Micah Sifry, How Obama’s Data-Crunching Prowess May Get 
Him Re-Elected, CNN.COM (Oct. 9, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/09/tech 
/innovation/obama-data-crunching-election/index.html?hpt=hp_c2 (describing 
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as by candidates and consultants contain information gleaned 
and purchased from public and private sources on nearly every 
voter in the United States.5 The goal of these “digital dossiers”6 
is to profile likely voters and identify traits that predict voting 
habits.7 Political data-mining has proven to be a winning elec-
tion tactic, but the resulting erosion of voter privacy has gone 
unabated. Although voters still enjoy privacy once they enter 
the voting booth, their movements outside the polling place are 
cataloged to an extent that may defeat the purpose of secret 
balloting.8  
This Note will explore the unique threats to the right to 
privacy posed by political data-mining. Section I explicates 
modern privacy law and details the process of data-mining. 
Section II examines how political campaigns use data-mining 
and how political data-mining poses unique threats to privacy. 
Section III looks at potential approaches to protecting privacy 
from political data-mining and recommends that the United 
States adopt a voter data disclosure law that allows voters to 
see what data campaigns maintain about them and gives voters 
the option of opting out of profiling. 
                                                          
the campaign’s success at the “modern mechanics of identifying, connecting 
with and mobilizing voters, as well as the challenge of integrating voter infor-
mation with the complex internal workings of a national campaign”). 
 5. James Verini, Big Brother Inc., VANITY FAIR, Dec. 2007, available at 
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/12/aristotle200712?printable=
true&currentPage=all (“Aristotle’s massive private database contains detailed 
information about roughly 175 million American voters.”); see also Garrett M. 
Graff, They Have Your Number, THE WASHINGTONIAN, Oct. 1, 2008, at 48 
available at http://www.washingtonian.com/print/articles/6/171/9627.html 
(noting that the Catalist database “contains some 280 million individual rec-
ords”). 
 6. “[D]igital dossiers are increasingly becoming digital biographies, a 
horde of aggregated bits of information combined to reveal a portrait of who 
we are based upon what we buy, the organizations we belong to, how we navi-
gate the Internet, and which shows and videos we watch.” DANIEL J. SOLOVE, 
THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
168 (2004) [hereinafter SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON]. 
 7. Leslie Wayne, Voter Profiles Selling Briskly as Privacy Issues Are 
Raised, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2000, at A10 (“[S]uch precise information is gold-
en, enabling them to identify potential supporters and not waste money on the 
unswayable.”). 
 8. “Development of the capacity for autonomous choice is an indispensa-
ble condition for reasoned participation in the governance of the community 
and its constituent institutions—political, economic, and social.” Julie E. Co-
hen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1426 (2000) [hereinafter Cohen, Examined Lives]. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
When Warren and Brandeis wrote “The Right to Privacy” 
in 1890, they were responding to technological advancements 
and newspaper enterprises that “threaten[ed] to make good the 
prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be pro-
claimed from the house-tops.’”9 They argued the law should 
recognize and protect the individual’s privacy, separate from 
existing slander, contract, and other laws.10 Seventy years lat-
er, William Prosser surveyed the still unsettled privacy land-
scape and identified four separate torts comprising the right to 
privacy: 1) intrusion of solitude; 2) public exposure of private 
facts; 3) false light publicity; and 4) appropriation of name or 
likeness.11 Courts today recognize all four of these torts, and 
many states have codified them.12 But as advancing technology 
changes the way individuals keep information to themselves or 
share it with others, legal scholars continue to struggle to de-
                                                          
 9. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. 
L. REV. 193, 195 (1890). 
 10. See id. at 197. 
 11. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
 12. Intrusion of solitude (or upon seclusion) has three elements: “(1) an 
intrusion; (2) that is highly offensive; and (3) into some matter in which a per-
son has a legitimate expectation of privacy.” Swarthout v. Mutual Service Life 
Ins. Co., 632 N.W.2d 741, 744 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that illicitly ob-
taining a patient’s medical records may be a breach of privacy). Public expo-
sure (or disclosure) of private facts occurs when “[p]ublicity [is] given to a mat-
ter concerning the private life of another, of a kind highly offensive to a 
reasonable person.” Pachowitz v. LeDoux, 666 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2003) (holding that disclosure of a patient’s medical condition by an emergency 
medical technician to a coworker could constitute an invasion of privacy 
claim). A claim of false light publicity requires “publicity to a matter concern-
ing another that places the other before the public in a false light” that “would 
be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Welling v. Weinfeld, 866 N.E.2d 
1051, 1059 (Ohio 2007) (holding false light publicity to be an actionable tort in 
Ohio); see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY 
LAW 24–25 (2003) (“The states have passed statutes protecting privacy in 
many contexts . . . from employment records and medical records to library 
records and student records.”); cf. Denver Pub. Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 894 
(Colo. 2002) (declining to recognize false light publicity as a tort separate from 
defamation). A person may be liable for a breach of privacy when he appropri-
ates another person’s name or likeness “to his own use or benefit.” Remsburg 
v. Docusearch, Inc., 149 N.H. 148, 157 (N.H. 2003) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C at 380) (explaining that personal information sold 
for the value of the information itself is not an actionable appropriation).  
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fine “privacy.”13 
A key theoretical difficulty with defining the right to priva-
cy is the overlapping areas of law that protect what we think of 
as privacy.14 The Constitution protects citizens from breaches 
of privacy by the government through the First, Fourth, and 
Fifth Amendments.15 The Supreme Court has also recognized 
that the Bill of Rights casts “penumbras” which create certain 
“zones of privacy” into which the government may not in-
trude.16 Breaches of privacy by nongovernmental entities fall 
under the privacy torts or state and federal statutes.17 A person 
who sexually harasses a coworker has violated the coworker’s 
privacy,18 and an employee who breaks a confidentiality 
agreement breaches his employer’s privacy.19 Neither case fits 
                                                          
 13. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 
477–48 (2006) [hereinafter Solove, Taxonomy]. (“Privacy is far too vague a con-
cept to guide adjudication and lawmaking, as abstract incantations of the im-
portance of ‘privacy’ do not fare well when pitted against more concretely stat-
ed countervailing interests.”). 
 14. See, e.g. Smith v. Stewart, 660 S.E.2d 822, 834 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) 
(holding plaintiff’s false light privacy claim to be encompassed in her defama-
tion claim); see also YAEL ONN ET AL., HAIFA CTR. OF LAW AND TECH., PRIVACY 
IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 2–4 (2005); Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 
483 (noting that American privacy law “extend[s] beyond torts to the constitu-
tional ‘right to privacy,’ Fourth Amendment law, evidentiary privileges, doz-
ens of federal privacy statutes, and hundreds of state privacy statutes”). 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press.”); U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”); U.S. CONST. amend. 
V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion.”); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding “that 
the Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house’”); Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (noting that what information a 
person “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, 
may be constitutionally protected”); SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 6, at 
62–64. 
 16. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 470, 484 (1965). 
 17. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4) (“There is a 
need to insure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsi-
bilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to 
privacy.”); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C § 6802 (2006) (restrict-
ing financial institutions’ use of consumers’ personal information). 
 18. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE 15 (2000) (“The sexual har-
assment cases . . . may be better conceived as invasions of privacy.”). 
 19. Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1271 (7th Cir. 1995) (sustain-
ing an injunction because employee’s job would require disclosure of trade se-
crets protected by a confidentiality agreement). 
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neatly within the privacy torts of intrusion on solitude or public 
disclosure of private facts, but both are apparently breaches of 
privacy. Sexual harassment statutes exist to govern the first 
case, and the law of contracts exists for the second. But other 
exposures of private facts and intrusion on solitude fall outside 
the privacy torts, contract law, and statutes yet still breach 
privacy.20 Privacy often exists in the negative space between 
laws, making it difficult to define. 
1. Limitations to the Right to Privacy 
The right to privacy has been defined broadly as the “claim 
of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for them-
selves when, how, and to what extent information about them 
is communicated to others,”21 but observers have identified sev-
eral limitations. Among those limitations, some argue that in-
formation involving the public interest should not be sup-
pressed by privacy laws.22 Warren and Brandeis argued privacy 
was not breached by disclosures in “court[s] of justice, in legis-
lative bodies, or the committees of those bodies” or in other 
public bodies.23 They also would exempt oral disclosures of pri-
vate information from privacy law.24 Once an individual con-
sents to publish private facts, he loses his right to privacy in 
those facts.25 The privacy torts generally only protect infor-
mation that would be “highly offensive” to a reasonable per-
son.26 The Constitution “protects people, not places,”27 but con-
stitutional protections against governmental breaches of 
privacy generally do not extend to public spaces, nor do they re-
strict invasions of privacy by private parties.28 Warren and 
Brandeis recommended damages and injunctive relief as reme-
dies for breaches of privacy, but were more skeptical of levying 
                                                          
 20. See, e.g., SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 6, at 81 (“Although 
contract law can protect privacy within relationships formed between parties, 
it does not redress privacy invasions by third parties outside of the contractual 
bonds.”). 
 21. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). 
 22. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 9, at 215. 
 23. Id. at 216. 
 24. Id. at 217. 
 25. Id. at 218. 
 26. See supra note 12. 
 27. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 28. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (holding that 
“[a] person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reason-
able expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”). 
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criminal sanctions.29 
The rights of private entities who breach privacy interests 
frequently outweigh the rights of the party whose privacy has 
been breached.30 Particularly in cases of political speech, courts 
balance the right to privacy against free speech and the free 
flow of information—and privacy usually loses.31 The First 
Amendment protects political speech above all other speech, 
but certain expressive activity falling under that protection 
breaches privacy.32 However, privacy may outweigh free speech 
interests if speech about private information is considered to 
hold a lower value than speech about public information.33 
2. Privacy-Related Harms 
Defamation, slander, breaches of confidentiality agree-
ments, sexual harassment, identity theft, intentional infliction 
of severe emotional distress are all causes of action that de-
scribe invasions of privacy, but they do not fully describe the 
nature of privacy or the nature of the harm when privacy is 
breached.34 Warren and Brandeis wrote of the necessity of 
                                                          
 29. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 9, at 219–20. 
 30. See, e.g., William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Persona: Bringing Pri-
vacy Theory to Election Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 859, 860 (2011) 
(“High Court rulings since [McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 
(1995)] have consistently upheld disclosure requirements in election law.”). 
 31. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The 
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Talking About You, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2000) (“While privacy protection secured by contract 
is constitutionally sound, broader information privacy rules are not easily de-
fensible under existing free speech law.”); see, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 
U.S. 514, 528 (2001) (holding individuals’ privacy interest in illegally-recorded 
conversations did not justify proscribing broadcast by the media); Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (“The ability of government, consonant with 
the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it 
is, in other words, dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy inter-
ests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.”); see also Ray-
mond T. Nimmer, “Privacy” and “Data Protection” Defined—”Data Protection” 
as a Contrasting Idea, in THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 17:5 (4th ed. 
2011). 
 32. See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21–22 (1971) (holding that wearing a 
“Fuck the Draft” jacket in public did not violate the privacy of bystanders to a 
sufficiently intolerable extent to justify prosecution). 
 33. See Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy 
Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 984 (2003). 
 34. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 18, at 17 (“Many of the liberties on this 
remarkable list are better conceived as invasions of privacy than as gender 
discrimination.”). 
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“some retreat from the world,” and that invasion of privacy 
causes the individual “mental pain and distress.”35 They also 
noted that some breaches of privacy can “destroy[] at once ro-
bustness of thought and delicacy of feeling.”36 That injury can 
be defined as harm to the individual’s autonomy.37 The harms 
to privacy are not to reputation like defamation, nor are they to 
economic interests like a breach of contract. Rather, the harms 
are psychic in nature, such as “incivility, lack of respect, or 
causing emotional angst.”38 Another category of injury related 
to privacy includes privacy architecture that involves “the crea-
tion of the risk that a person might be harmed in the future.”39 
B. PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
Rapid technological advancement has made retreat from 
the world a more complicated concept. Moore’s Law states that 
the number of transistors that can fit on a microchip doubles 
every two years.40 At the time of Prosser’s article, engineers 
were putting around thirty transistors on a chip.41 In 2012, In-
tel expects to release its latest chip, “Poulson,” which it claims 
will hold 3.1 billion transistors.42 This exponential growth in 
the memory and speed of processors has made possible techno-
logical advancement as well as new ways to encroach on priva-
cy.43 The Internet, computers, cameras, and other technologies 
have collected and exposed individuals’ personal information in 
ways unforeseen by Prosser and earlier privacy scholars.44 
                                                          
 35. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 9, at 196. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Autonomy harms are “privacy harms affect the nature of society and 
impede individual activities that contribute to the greater social good.” Solove, 
Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 488. 
 38. Id. at 486. 
 39. Id. at 487. 
 40. Excerpts from A Conversation with Gordon Moore: Moore’s Law, 
INTEL.COM (2005), available at ftp://download.intel.com/museum/ Moores_ 
Law/Video-Transcripts/Excepts_A_Conversation_with_Gordon_ Moore.pdf. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Pauline Nist, Itanium Poulson Update - Greater Parallelism, New In-
struction Replay & More: Catch the Details from Hotchips!, THE SERVER ROOM 
BLOG (Aug. 19, 2011), http://communities.intel.com/community/openportit/ 
server/blog/2011/08/19/itanium-poulson-update--greater-parallelism-new-in 
struction-replay-more-catch-the-details-from-hotchips. 
 43. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 6, at 14 (“As processing 
speeds accelerated and as memory ballooned, computers provided a vastly in-
creased ability to collect, search, analyze, and transfer records.”) 
 44. Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 478 (“[N]ew technologies have 
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1. Privacy-breaching Technology 
To demonstrate the new threats to privacy, students at 
Fordham Law School compiled a fifteen-page personal dossier 
on Justice Antonin Scalia based on information found on the 
Web.45 Such a dossier goes well beyond the newspaper accounts 
of Samuel Warren’s daughter’s wedding that inspired “The 
Right to Privacy.”46 The threats to privacy contemplated by 
Warren and Brandeis and Prosser do not map neatly onto 
twenty-first century technology.47 Cameras, cell-phones, con-
sumer transactions, Global Positioning System (GPS) devices in 
cars, tollbooths, email, monitoring software, cookies, and other 
technologies produce vast amounts of personal data in increas-
ingly large and powerful databases.48 Consumers’ quotidian 
transactions that once left no trace now leave behind a digital 
trail.49 The Internet has created new activities that leave be-
hind their own traceable digital trails.50 Technology allows con-
sumers to shop from the privacy of their homes, but online 
shopping produces data that can be cataloged, so even though 
any single transaction might be noticed by fewer onlookers, the 
details of that transaction will be remembered in the consum-
er’s “digital dossier.”51 
                                                          
given rise to a panoply of new privacy harms.”). 
 45. See Noam Cohen, Law Students Teach Scalia About Privacy and the 
Web, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2009, at B3. Justice Scalia called the exercise “an 
example of perfectly legal, abominably poor judgment.” Id. 
 46. ROSEN, supra note 18, at 7 (“What outraged Brandeis and Warren was 
a mild society item in the Boston Saturday Evening Gazette that described a 
lavish breakfast party Warren himself had put on for his daughter’s wed-
ding.”). 
 47. See generally Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 
WASH. L. REV. 119 (2004) (analyzing privacy issues with modern technology). 
 48. See, e.g., ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 283–300  (2005);  
Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1473–1501 
(2000). 
 49. See O’HARROW, supra note 48, at 284–85 (describing the types of data 
companies record: web-browsing data, TiVO data, credit card transactions, 
etc.). 
 50. “Clickstream data,” for example, includes “data about [the user’s] ISP, 
computer hardware and software, the website she linked from, and exactly 
what parts of the website she explored and for how long.” SOLOVE, DIGITAL 
PERSON, supra note 6, at 23–24. 
 51. Id. at 1 (“A dossier is a collection of detailed data about an individu-
al.”). 
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2. Threats to Privacy from Aggregation 
Although individuals might not expect any particular per-
sonal datum to remain secret, aggregation of personal data “re-
veals facts about data subjects in ways far beyond anything 
they expected when they gave out the data.”52 Transactional 
data can be analyzed in the aggregate to identify market trends 
or it can be linked to individuals to identify individual habits.53 
Aggregation was historically not considered among privacy 
harms because the technology making aggregation possible and 
profitable came about in recent decades.54 In at least one case, 
the Supreme Court recognized aggregation of public infor-
mation as an intrusion into privacy, noting “the distinction, in 
terms of personal privacy, between scattered disclosure of the 
bits of information contained in a rap sheet and revelation of 
the rap sheet as a whole.”55 Justice Sotomayor, concurring in 
United States v. Jones, discussed the dangers to privacy in the 
digital age when the government aggregates personal data, 
proposing that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise 
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”56 Aggrega-
tion violates privacy by revealing aspects of a person’s private 
life he might prefer to be kept private.57 But aggregation cre-
                                                          
 52. Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 507. “When analyzed, aggregated 
information can reveal new facts about a person that she did not expect would 
be known about her when the original, isolated data was collected.” Id. at 506. 
 53. See id. at 511–12. 
 54. Id. at 505–06 (describing the apprehension that arose in the 1960s 
when the rise of computers allowed for aggregation of data). 
 55. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 
U.S. 749, 764 (1989) (holding disclosure of Federal Bureau of Investigation rap 
sheets to be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy). Other courts, how-
ever, have found this analysis of aggregation inapplicable outside Freedom of 
Information Act cases. Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 519. 
 56. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. No. 10–1259, 5 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). The government argued warrantless GPS tracking is permissible 
because individuals have no expectation of privacy in public spaces, but Re-
spondent argued the expectation to be seen at discrete times and places is not 
the expectation for each discrete sighting to be aggregated. See Brief of Elec-
tronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259, 2011 WL 4564007 (Oct. 3, 
2011) (“GPS tracking systems allow officers to comb stored data to conduct 
new searches using a suspect’s historical location data, as well as to aggregate 
data from a variety of sources, both public and private.”). 
 57. Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 507 (aggregation upsets individu-
als’ expectations about “certain limits on what is known about them and on 
what others will find out”). 
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ates distorted summaries of individuals because “the data is of-
ten reductive and disconnected from the original context in 
which it was gathered.”58 The harm from data-mining generally 
comes from “being misdefined and judged out of context in a 
world of short attention spans, a world in which information 
can easily be confused with knowledge.”59 
3. Existing Data Privacy Laws 
Congress has enacted a variety of laws intended to protect 
privacy in specific, limited contexts. The Privacy Act of 1974 
governs governmental agencies’ collection and maintenance of 
personal information.60 The Cable Communications Policy Act 
of 1984 “requires cable operators to inform subscribers about 
the nature and uses of personal information collected”61 and to 
obtain consent from subscribers before collecting personal in-
formation. Additionaly it prohibits cable operators from disclos-
ing personal information unless doing so is necessary for “legit-
imate business activity related to, a cable service or other 
service provided by the cable operator to the subscriber.”62 The 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 “restricts the 
interception of transmitted communications and the searching 
of stored communications.”63 The Computer Matching and Pri-
vacy Protection Act of 1988 restricts disclosure of information 
between federal agencies and requires agencies to provide indi-
viduals with a copy of their records on request.64 The Driver’s 
Privacy Protection Act of 1994 deals with the issue of the gov-
ernment selling data to private parties by restricting the dis-
closure and resale of information obtained by state depart-
ments of motor vehicles.65 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
prohibits financial institutions from sharing nonpublic personal 
information with third parties without allowing consumers to 
                                                          
 58. Id. at 507. 
 59. ROSEN, supra note 18, at 8. 
 60. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006). 
 61. SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 6, at 68. 
 62. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(A) (2006). 
 63. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22; 2701–10 (2006). See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, 
supra note 6, at 68. 
 64. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006). 
 65. 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2006). See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 6, 
at 69. 
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opt out.66 States too have statutes protecting data privacy, such 
as the Minnesota Data Practices Act, which governs the “collec-
tion, creation, storage, maintenance, dissemination, and access 
to government data in government entities.”67 All these stat-
utes contain loopholes that allow for privacy to be breached.68 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has recommended a set 
of voluntary data privacy principles for private entities to 
adopt.69 The four principles are: 1) giving consumers “transpar-
ency and control”; 2) “reasonable security and limited data re-
tention”; 3) notice of privacy policy changes; and 4) “affirmative 
express consent before they use sensitive data.”70 The FTC does 
not mandate adoption of these principles, but some entities 
have voluntarily incorporated them into their privacy policies.71 
More recently, the White House released its Consumer Privacy 
Bill of Rights and called on Congress to codify its contents and 
grant the FTC authority to enforce it.72 
4. Redefining the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age 
The broadening universe of data sources has led to new 
ways of conceptualizing the right to privacy. A brief overview of 
these approaches provides a useful toolbox for evaluat-
                                                          
 66. 15 U.S.C. § 6802 (2006); see SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 6, at 
70. 
 67. MINN. STAT. § 13.01 subd. 3 (2011). The statute also limits the state’s 
use of cookies to collect information. MINN. STAT. § 13.15 (2011). 
 68. The Privacy Act of 1974, Computer Matching and Privacy Protection 
Act, and Minnesota Data Practices Act govern only government records. 5 
U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006); MINN. STAT. § 13.01 subd. 3 (2011). The Cable Com-
munications Policy Act of 1984 allows disclosure of personal information as 
part of “legitimate business activity.” 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(A) (2006). The Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act “is not well-tailored to addressing a large 
portion of private-sector information gathering in cyberspace.” SOLOVE, 
DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 6, at 69. The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act ap-
plies only to departments of motor vehicles and not to other state agencies. Id. 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley’s “opt-out default creates incentives for privacy notices 
that lead to inaction by the consumer.” Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default 
Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1241 (2002). 
 69. FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE 
BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 11–12 (Feb. 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov 
/os/2009/02/P085400behavadreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC STAFF REPORT]. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE 
GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 35–36 (2012). 
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ing twenty-first century privacy breaches. Daniel Solove’s Tax-
onomy of Privacy attempts to flesh out the right to privacy by 
naming four categories of harmful activities having to do with 
personal information: 1) collection, 2) processing, 3) dissemina-
tion, and 4) invasion.73 
Neil Richards suggests moving away from the concept of 
privacy in the realm of personal data and instead conceptualiz-
ing the problem in terms of data protection and confidentiali-
ty.74 Richards argues that “‘data protection’ can draw attention 
to the specific problems associated with databases without risk-
ing an association with all of the assorted baggage that privacy 
connotes.”75 Based on the data protection paradigm, the 1996 
European Community Directive on Data Protection supplies a 
Digital Age framework for personal data.76 The Directive limits 
acceptable uses of personal data and allows individuals to 
maintain some control over their personal information.77 It also 
requires member countries to balance privacy rights with the 
free flow of data.78 The five principles of the EU Directive are 
that personal data are: 1) “processed fairly and lawfully”; 2) 
“collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes”; 3) 
“adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpos-
es for which they are collected and/or further processed”; 4) “ac-
curate”; and 5) “kept in a form which permits identification of 
data subjects for no longer than is necessary.”79 This approach 
is consistent with Westin’s definition of privacy as the “claim of 
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves 
when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
                                                          
 73. Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 489. This Note will focus on 
harms from processing and dissemination, because these categories tend to 
include the harms associated with political data-mining. 
 74. Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 
1087, 1135 (2006). 
 75. Id. at 1137; see also Raymond T. Nimmer, “Privacy” and “Data Protec-
tion” Defined-—”Data Protection” as a Contrasting Idea, in THE LAW OF 
COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 17:5 (4th ed. 2011) (noting that data protection “cen-
ters on control of personally identifiable data, rather than on protected secre-
cy.”). 
 76. Council Directive 95/46, art. 1, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38 (EC) [hereinaf-
ter EU DIRECTIVE]. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at art. 1 (“Member States shall neither restrict nor prohibit the 
free flow of personal data between Member States for reasons connected with 
the protection afforded under paragraph 1.”). 
 79. Id. at art. 6. 
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communicated to others.”80 
Another useful approach to privacy in the computing age 
may be “contextual integrity.”81 Individuals pass through a va-
riety of different spheres or contexts in their day-to-day lives, 
and each sphere comes with its own set of norms.82 Personal in-
formation that may be shared in certain contexts cannot be ap-
propriately shared in others.83 Privacy is breached when these 
norms are transgressed.84 For example, a vendor who main-
tains records of its customers’ purchases and contact infor-
mation operates within these norms, but the vendor trans-
gresses norms of appropriateness and distribution by sharing 
customer information with third parties.85 Cheaper, more pow-
erful technology lowers the cost of breaching contextual integri-
ty by recording personal information and storing it for a frac-
tion of what it would cost to manually do so. Furthermore, 
aggregating data adds value, thus making the practice of sys-
tematically breaching contextual integrity profitable. 
C. DATA-MINING CONSUMER INFORMATION 
The parties to a financial transaction are said to equally 
own the facts to the  transaction.86 But advancing technology 
has made collection, aggregation, and dissemination of personal 
information feasible and profitable for an increasing number of 
actors, many of whom are not present at the initial transac-
tion.87 The data from these transactions are compiled in con-
                                                          
 80. WESTIN, supra note 23, at 7. 
 81. Nissenbaum, supra note 47, at 136–43  (describing the informational 
norms of “appropriateness” and “distribution” and arguing that privacy is 
breached when these norms are transgressed). 
 82. Individuals “are at home with families, they go to work, they seek 
medical care, visit friends, consult with psychiatrists, talk with lawyers, go to 
the bank, attend religious services, vote, shop,” and norms in each context 
govern “roles, expectations, actions, and practices.” Id. at 137. 
 83. “[T]he patient shares information about his or her physical condition 
with the physician but not vice versa.” Id. at 138. “[W]e are not (at least in the 
United States) expected to share our religious affiliation with employers, fi-
nancial standing with friends and acquaintances, performance at work with 
physicians, etc.” Id. at 138–39. 
 84. Id.   at 138 (“[A] complaint that privacy has been violated is sound in 
the event that one or the other types of the informational norms has been 
transgressed.”). 
 85. Id. at 152–53. 
 86. Froomkin, supra note 48, at 1502. 
 87. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 6, at 3–4 (2004) (“Countless 
companies maintain computerized records of their customers’ preferences, 
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sumer databases, aggregated, and sold.88 While this sort of con-
sumer data-mining has existed for years, increasingly powerful 
online tools now track users’ movements around the web and 
compile digital dossiers.89 The commodification of personal data 
allows websites to provide users with content free of charge; 
users pay for content with their personal data instead of mon-
ey.90 Shopper loyalty cards, another major source of consumer 
data, make discounts and coupons available to users.91 Most 
consumers probably understand that vendors compile data 
about their customers, and many consumers probably under-
stand that they trade their personal information in exchange 
for the free use of websites, but “[f]ewer are aware that this in-
formation is shipped off and aggregated in data warehouses 
where it is organized, stored, and analyzed.”92 
1. Methods of Collecting Consumer Data 
“Big Data” is a multi-billion dollar industry.93 Firms amass 
data on everything from soil quality to medical information and 
                                                          
purchase, and activities. . . . [a]nd there are hundreds of companies people 
aren’t even aware of that maintain their personal information.”); see also EU 
DIRECTIVE, supra note 76, at paragraph (4) (“[T]he progress made in infor-
mation technology is making the processing and exchange of such data consid-
erably easier.”). 
 88. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 6, at 18–21. “There are 
around five database compilers that have data on almost all households in the 
United States.” Id. at 20. 
 89. See Julia Angwin, The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. 
J., July 30, 2010, at W1. “Tracking isn’t new. But the technology is growing so 
powerful and ubiquitous that even some of America’s biggest sites say they 
were unaware, until informed by the Journal, that they were installing intru-
sive files on visitors’ computers.” Id. 
 90. See generally FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 69, at i (“[P]otential ben-
efits of the practice to consumers, include[] the free online content that online 
advertising generally supports, the personalized advertising that many con-
sumers may value, and a potential reduction in unwanted advertising.”). 
 91. See, e.g., Dan Sewell, Kroger Really Knows About Its Customers’ Buy-
ing Habits, THE LEDGER, (Jan. 6, 2009), http://www.theledger.com 
/article/20090106/NEWS/901060335. These cards have also been used to alert 
consumers to product recalls. Steve Raabe, Shopper-card Data Traced for Oth-
er Uses, DENV. POST (June 10, 2010), http://www.denverpost.com/business 
/ci_15264783. 
 92. Nissenbaum, supra note 47, at 121. 
 93. See Quentin Hardy, The Big Business of ‘Big Data’,  NYTIMES.COM 
(Oct. 24, 2011) http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/24/big-data/ 
?scp=1&sq=data%20mining&st=cse (noting that Hewlett-Packard recently 
bought a data company named Autonomy for $10.3 billion). 
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“cleverly sift[] through it to find and exploit new patterns and 
relationships.”94 The value from this activity comes from being 
able to target ads for goods and services to likely customers, 
thus limiting the waste of dollars spent on advertising to non-
customers.95 When an individual gives out personal infor-
mation, he typically does so not expecting that data to be sold 
to third parties for uses unrelated to the original transaction.96 
Users of frequent shopper cards trade their contact information 
for coupons and discounts.97 Vendors, such as grocery stores, 
track customers’ purchases through the shopper cards, allowing 
them to target relevant coupons at particular customers.98 But 
third party data-miners may purchase shopper card data, ag-
gregate it with other personal data, and resell it to other ven-
dors without the individual’s knowledge. 
A variety of data-mining tools surreptitiously gather in-
formation from web users. For many years, “cookies” have rec-
orded the websites people visit.99 New tools “scan in real time 
what people are doing on a Web page, then instantly assess lo-
cation, income, shopping interests and even medical condi-
tions.”100 The user need not complete a transaction for a tracker 
to obtain information; a mere web search provides useful da-
ta.101 The information gathered by these tools is bought and 
                                                          
 94. Id. Hardy makes the case that the Big Data bubble may be about to 
burst as lofty expectations fall in line with reality and the technology “turn[s] 
from a competitive edge into a must-have.” Id. 
 95. Id. (“When you know what someone has purchased, you can make a 
case of what ad to put in front of them next.”). 
 96. “Secondary use resembles breach of confidentiality, in that there is a 
betrayal of the person’s expectations when giving out information.” Solove, 
Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 522. 
 97. Sewell, supra note 91. 
 98. Id. Simon Hay, CEO of Kroger’s data-mining firm, dunnhumby, notes 
the dangers to Kroger of selling customer information to third parties: “We 
understand that this is long-term, and if we do anything to exploit that rela-
tionship, then we destroy the value for our clients.” Id. 
 99. Angwin, supra note 89, at W1. 
 100. Id. “Tracking is done by tiny files and programs known as ‘cookies,’ 
‘Flash cookies’ and ‘beacons.’” Id. 
 101. The FTC provides the following example: 
[A] consumer visits a travel website and searches for airline flights to 
New York City.  The consumer does not purchase any tickets, but lat-
er visits the website of a local newspaper to read about the Washing-
ton Nationals baseball team.  While on the newspaper’s website, the 
consumer receives an advertisement from an airline featuring flights 
from Washington D.C. to New York City. 
FTC STAFF REPORT supra note 69, at 3. 
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sold amongst a network of data firms and advertisers for the 
purpose of creating precisely targeted ads to appeal to particu-
lar users.102 Some firms analyze the data to predict the user’s 
tastes and preferences.103 Users themselves likely realize how 
many tools are tracking them at any given time, but, more sur-
prisingly, many website proprietors know how many cookies, 
beacons, and other tools their own sites are installing on users’ 
computers.104 
2. Harms from Consumer Data-Mining 
In a situation where a citizen’s consumer, Internet, and po-
litical transactions are recorded, compiled, and sold, the citizen 
suffers at least two injuries. First, knowing that his transac-
tions are being observed—let alone recorded, compiled, and 
commoditized—may cause the citizen to alter his behavior.105 
In this way, the citizen’s autonomy is harmed; he may be dis-
couraged from consumption or political participation that he 
believes will be made public.106 Second, the aggregation of con-
sumer and political transaction data creates digital dossiers—
rich descriptions of citizens’ lives that go beyond what an indi-
vidual consents to as part of his public persona.107 Both harms 
violate the individual’s autonomy by creating an imbalance in 
                                                          
 102. See generally Angwin, supra note 89, at W1. See also FTC STAFF 
REPORT, supra note 69, at i (defining online behavioral advertising as “the 
practice of tracking an individual’s online activities in order to deliver adver-
tising tailored to the individual’s interests.”). 
 103. Angwin, supra note 89, at W2. “[S]ome tracking companies use proba-
bility algorithms to try to pair what they know about a person’s online behav-
ior with data from offline sources about household income, geography and ed-
ucation, among other things.” Id. 
 104. Id. The article reports that Comcast was unaware that Comcast.net 
installed fifty-five cookies on the Wall Street Journal’s test computer. One 
tracking company, BlueKai, allows individuals to see their digital profile and 
opt out of tracking. BlueKai Registry, BLUEKAI, http://www.bluekai.com/reg 
istry/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2012). The Wall Street Journal recently updated its 
privacy policy to “allow the site to connect personally identifiable information 
with Web browsing data without user consent.” Joe Coscarelli, The Wall Street 
Journal’s New Privacy Policy Is Everything They Taught Us to Fear, DAILY 
INTEL, (Sept. 28, 2011), http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2011/09/the_wall 
_street_journals_new_p.html. 
 105. Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 488 (surveillance can have a 
chilling effect on individuals, “making them less likely to attend political ral-
lies or criticize popular views.”). 
 106. Id. 
 107. SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 6, at 1. 
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power relationships surrounding individual decision-making.108 
Injuries to individual autonomy in the political sphere may be 
uniquely harmful and require unique remedies.109 
II. POLITICAL DATA-MINING 
If the problem with data-mining in general is that it 
“seek[s] to shape and predict individual behavior according to 
externally-determined trajectories of opportunity and de-
sire,”110 we should be particularly wary of its role in electoral 
politics. Aristotle’s John Phillips admits, “[e]very campaign 
that we work with wants you to believe that it’s shoe leather 
that wins the race, or great issues, or the love of the people, but 
the fact of the matter is a lot of it is the nitty-gritty organiza-
tion.”111 Data-mining in the consumer sphere spurs concerns 
over consumer privacy, but when the same techniques are used 
in the political sphere “it begins to pull back the curtain of one 
of the most protected locations in America, the voting booth.”112 
In the past three decades, political candidates have increasing-
ly come to rely on extensive, detailed voter databases—such as 
Voter Vault, Catalist, and Aristotle—compiled from both pub-
licly available election data and the consumer data compiled 
over the years by businesses.113 Catalist, a privately-owned 
progressive database, includes “data from frequent-buyer cards 
at supermarkets and pharmacies, hunting- and fishing-license 
registries, catalog- and magazine-subscription lists, member-
ship rolls from unions, professional associations, and advocacy 
groups such as the ACLU and the NRA.”114 In 2004, the Repub-
                                                          
 108. Richards, supra note 74, at 1094. 
 109. The secret ballot, after all, affords a zone of privacy for the voter that 
consumers are not entitled to. Ari Schwartz, an analyst at the Center for De-
mocracy and Technology said “we are especially concerned when we are talk-
ing about voting and citizenship, things that are so central to the election pro-
cess.” Wayne, supra note 7, at A10. 
 110. Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 8, at 1376. 
 111. Verini, supra note 5. 
 112. Wayne, supra note 7, at A10. 
 113. See Verini, supra note 5 (“Aristotle can tell its clients more than just 
the predictable stuff—where you live, your phone number, who lives with you, 
your birthday, how many children you have. It may also know how much you 
make, how much your house is worth, what kind of car you drive, what Web 
sites you visit, and whether you went to college, attend church, own guns, 
have had a sex change, or have been convicted of a felony or sex crime. It can 
pry into every corner of your life.”). Every President since Ronald Reagan has 
hired Aristotle as a consultant. Id. 
 114. Graff, supra note 5, at 40. 
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lican National Committee (RNC) used its database, Voter 
Vault, to establish data dominance by micro-targeting voters 
who might otherwise have been excluded from mail drops.115 By 
2008, the Democrats had surpassed the RNC’s data capabilities 
through the privately run Catalist, and now the parties are en-
gaged in a data-arms race for 2012.116 Matching personal data 
to specific individuals allows candidates to send direct mail to 
voters, canvas potentially friendly voters living in unfriendly 
territory, and prospect potential donors.117 It also allows cam-
paigns to evaluate likely voters based on patterns in data and 
surveys, and then predict likely voting habits.118 
While consumer data is compiled, aggregated, and sold by 
private firms, an increasing amount of data on citizens is made 
publicly available  through government websites. Of particular 
interest to political data-miners is data on voters and campaign 
finance.119 Voter registration information is available through 
many states’ Secretary of State120 as well as through private 
services.121 Campaign finance data at the state, federal, and lo-
cal levels are even easier to access online.122 With relatively lit-
                                                          
 115. See id. 
 116. Kate Kaye, Republican Party Aims to Match Democrats’ Data 
Strength, CLICKZ (June 6, 2011), http://www.clickz.com/clickz/news/2076532/ 
republican-party-aims-match-democrats-strength; Sifry, supra note 4. 
 117. See, e.g., Wayne, supra note 7, at A10 (describing how the political 
consulting firm Aristotle provides data that allows candidates to send person-
alized letters to specific types of donors and to target “Fat Cats” for fundrais-
ing). 
 118. Graff, supra note 5, at 40 (“[S]ome of the strongest predictors of politi-
cal ideology are things like education, homeownership, income level, and 
household size. Religion and gun ownership are the two most powerful predic-
tors of partisan ID.”). 
 119. Past voting and donation history are some of the most accurate predic-
tors of future voting and donation habits. 
 120. See, e.g., Confidentiality Notice, OFFICE OF THE MINNESOTA 
SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.state.mn.us/index.aspx?page=207 (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2012) (“Access to the data that you supply on your voter regis-
tration application is restricted to elections officials and to those who obtain 
the list for political, law enforcement and jury selection purposes.”). 
 121. See, e.g., VOTER HISTORY, http://voterhistory.com/ (last visited Mar. 9, 
2012) (“For each voter, we have 10 year voting history (that’s 5 cycles for gen-
eral, primary and joint(city) elections); demographic (data); home appraised 
value; and (future) personality trait data that can be meaningful to target-
ing.”). 
 122. See Campaign Finance Reports Search and Lists, TEXAS ETHICS 
COMMISSION, http://www.ethics.state.tx.us/dfs/search_CF.htm  (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2012). For example, the Texas Ethics Commission allows anyone visit-
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tle effort and cost, a data-miner can compile a useful voter da-
tabase from just publicly available data.123 A data-miner can 
then purchase consumer data and match it to the voting and 
contribution data based on names and contact information.124 
The result is a database that can quickly identify a citizen’s 
name, address, employer, occupation, phone number, email ad-
dress, party affiliation, voting history, donor history, purchas-
ing habits, and web browsing history.125 
Campaigns running their own databases from just publicly 
available sources can augment their data with information 
gleaned from their own voter contact, through canvassing, 
phone banking, or fund-raising. The most sophisticated private 
database operators allow campaigns that buy their lists to add 
data to the master database from their own campaign data-
bases and voter contact.126 When a campaign gathers infor-
mation for its own use, the voter at least knows who is using 
the data, but when voter data is compiled across candidates 
and election cycles in large national databases, the voter can 
lose sight of his information. 
Campaigns have long used voter registration and history 
data to target likely voters.127 Contribution history is an accu-
rate predictor of future contributions, so this data has been a 
staple of political fundraising. Federal contribution data is 
readily available, but the Federal Election Campaign Act pro-
hibits use of this data for fundraising or commercial purpos-
es.128 Aggregation of personal data from a variety of sources 
gives campaigns the power to create more detailed profiles of 
                                                          
ing its website to download its entire campaign finance report database, in-
cluding names, addresses, occupations, employers, and contribution histories 
of donors to political campaigns in Texas. Id. 
 123. See id.  
 124. See, e.g., Wayne, supra note 7, at A10 (noting that Aristotle blends 
voter data it has collected with consumer data purchased from other data-
bases). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Catalist asks its clients to report data they find during the campaign, 
either in real-time or at the end of the campaign. Graff, supra note 5, at 43. 
 127. Verini, supra note 5 (recounting the data operations of Presidents 
Carter, Kennedy, and Lincoln). 
 128. 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) (2006) (“[A]ny information copied from such re-
ports or statements may not be sold or used by any person for the purpose of 
soliciting contributions or for commercial purposes, other than using the name 
and address of any political committee to solicit contributions from such com-
mittee.”). 
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individual voters than ever before.129 One important use of the-
se profiles has been micro-targeting, whereby a campaign can 
tailor its message to certain voters with relative precision.130 
Where in the past a campaign might send a piece of direct mail 
to every female who voted in three of the past four Democratic 
primaries, now campaigns can target, say, Volvo drivers, or vis-
itors to The Drudge Report. Campaigns can micro-target to en-
courage friendly voters to cast ballots for a candidate, or they 
can micro-target to suppress their opponent’s voters.131 By 
some estimates, micro-targeting allowed George W. Bush to 
win Ohio, and thus reelection, in 2004.132 
New methods of politicking yield more data. President 
Obama’s campaign Facebook page has twenty-three million 
“likes” and an app to gather data on all those twenty-three mil-
lion users.133 President Obama’s campaign shares data from 
field-level organizers up the hierarchy through its own social 
networking tool.134 The ability of databases to keep track of 
                                                          
 129. Graff, supra note 5, at 39 (“In past years, campaigns couldn’t sort the 
electorate and use finely grained outreach and mobilization techniques. Today, 
thanks to expensive and powerful databases like the GOP’s Voter Vault and 
the progressive startup Catalist, targeting voting blocs is as simple as check-
ing boxes on a computer screen.”). 
 130. In 2008, the Obama campaign was able to “custom-tailor cable-
television ads down to the Zip Code in Iowa, or send a canvasser to a voter’s 
doorstep armed with a computer-generated picture of that person’s political 
personality.” Verini, supra note 5. 
 131. See Nichole Rustin-Paschal, Symposium, Online Behavioral Advertis-
ing and Deceptive Campaign Tactics: Policy Issues, 19 WM & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 907, 913 (2011) (“In an increasingly information-based society, deceptive 
campaigns will likely be launched in ways that take advantage of tools provid-
ed by web-based technologies for communicating and organizing.”). 
 132. Vanity Fair reports that in 2004 Karl Rove took advantage of micro-
targeting to “sen[d] shock troops into Democratic pockets of blue-collar work-
ers and minorities with personalized appeals to the churchgoing, the gun-
owning, the abortion-hating. The result was a lead of 130,000 votes that 
tipped the election to Bush.” Verini, supra note 5. On the other hand, Demo-
cratic National Committee chairman Terry McAuliffe remarked, upon learning 
his party’s database contained 1.1 million incorrect entries in Florida in 2000, 
“Don’t you think we could have found 537 votes if we had corrected that in-
formation earlier and contacted 1.1 million more people?” Graff, supra note 5, 
at 40. 
 133. Sifry, supra note 4 (“Users of the Obama 2012 - Are You In? app are 
not only giving the campaign personal data like their name, gender, birthday, 
current city, religion and political views, they are sharing their list of friends 
and information those friends share, like their birthday, current city, religion 
and political views.”). 
 134. Id. (NationalField allows the campaign to compile “information they 
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voters who move across state lines eliminates the old problem 
of losing data on voters who move.135 Local campaigns also take 
advantage of big voter databases; Fort Wayne, Indiana Repub-
lican mayoral candidate Paula Hughes used Voter Vault in her 
unsuccessful 2011 campaign.136 Although Hughes lost, the data 
collected by her campaign will be valuable for candidates in the 
2012 cycle.137 At the cutting edge of political data-mining, the 
Obama campaign’s “Dreamcatcher” project will use text analyt-
ics to glean political beliefs and motivations from voters’ narra-
tives entered on the campaign’s website.138 
Political data-mining raises a variety of concerns that this 
Note will only briefly discuss. Databases containing personal 
voter information have been compromised in the past. One of 
the largest voter databases, Aristotle, was caught selling data 
to unverified individuals, such as “Britney Spears” and “Con-
doleezza Rice,” in 2003.139 Aristotle also falsely claimed at the 
time that it “never added information from market research to 
its voter files”140 Aristotle sells data to Democrats and Republi-
cans, as well as candidates from Ukraine, Algeria, Kosovo, 
Venezuela, and the Palestinian Fatah party.141 The Obama and 
McCain campaigns’ computers were hacked during the 2008 
election.142 Micro-targeting can lead to a different set of harms, 
                                                          
are gathering as they work on tasks like signing up volunteers, knocking on 
doors, identifying likely voters and dealing with problems,” as well as “qualita-
tive data.”). 
 135. Graff, supra note 5, at 43. 
 136. Tom LoBianco, Ind. Dems, GOP Use Mayoral Races to Build for 2012, 
POST TRIBUNE (Indiana) (Oct. 30, 2011), http://posttrib.suntimes.com/news/ 
8512679-418/ind-dems-gop-use-mayoral-races-to-build-for-2012.html (“Hughes 
has gotten access to more voters and the state party has updated its vast store 
of information relying on phone calls and canvassing done on Hughes’ be-
half.”). 
 137. See id. 
 138. Sasha Issenberg, Project Dreamcatcher: How cutting-edge text analyt-
ics can help the Obama campaign determine voters’ hopes and fears, 
SLATE.COM (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics 
/victory_lab/2012/01/project_dreamcatcher_how_cutting_edge_text_analytics_c
an_help_the_obama_campaign_determine_voters_hopes_and_fears_.html. 
 139. Kim Zetter, For Sale: The American Voter, WIRED.COM (Dec. 11, 2003), 
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2003/12/61543. 
 140. Id. Aristotle now acknowledges “that it adds consumer marketing data 
to voter information.” Kim Zetter, Voter Privacy Is Gone–Get Over It, 
WIRED.COM (Jan. 31, 2008), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/01/voter-
privacy-i/. 
 141. Verini, supra note 5. 
 142. Philip N. Howard & Daniel Kreiss, Political Parties and Voter Privacy: 
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especially voter deception.143 
III. APPROACHES TO PROTECTING VOTER PRIVACY 
If enacted, the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights will change 
the ways private firms collect consumer data and at least have 
some effect on the voter data campaigns gather from data-
miners, but it is not clear whether the codified Bill would apply 
directly to political data-mining.144 The Bill’s principles should 
apply to political data-mining, so a voter privacy measure 
would be a valuable outcome of the multi-stakeholder process 
encouraged by the White House.145 American democracy al-
ready recognizes and protects voter privacy, at least at the poll-
ing place.146 But political life encompasses more than merely 
casting a ballot; new technology allows for broad dissemination 
of views and new means of debate.147 Political participation 
online may be stifled without privacy protections—scrutiny of 
online voter activity may distort voter participation.148 Given 
                                                          
Australia, Canada,the United Kingdom, and United States in Comparative 
Perspective, FIRST MONDAY (2010), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ 
ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2975/2627. 
 143. See Rustin-Paschal, supra note 131, at 914 (arguing that the Internet 
“serve[s] not only to bring people together, but to launch deceptive cam-
paigns”); Daniel Kreiss, Yes We Can (Profile You), 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 70, 
74 (2012), available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-
paradox/political-data. (noting that micro-targeting means “campaigns can de-
velop narrow appeals based on ideology and self-interest and direct them to 
different groups of voters, appearing to be all things to all people.”). 
 144. See WHITE HOUSE, supra note 72, at 10 (“The Consumer Privacy Bill 
of Rights applies to commercial uses of personal data.”). 
 145. See id. at 23–24 (discussing the multi-stakeholder process). 
 146. See Nissenbaum, supra note 47, at 146 (“From the moment [voters] 
cross the threshold, information flows are highly regulated, from what elec-
tions officers can ask them to what they can ask officers, what voters are re-
quired to document in writing, who sees it, what happens to the vote cast and 
who sees that, what exit pollsters can ask citizens as they leave—for whom 
they voted but not voters’ names—and what the exit pollsters are free to dis-
seminate publicly.”). 
 147. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 928 (“But political participation in mod-
ern democratic life can take many forms: financial contributions to candidates, 
political parties, and advocacy groups; petition signing; political speech and 
debate; communication with and lobbying of officials; attending public meet-
ings; holding office . . . paying taxes, obeying the law, or performing public 
service or charitable work in one’s community.”). 
 148. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. 
REV. 1609, 1651 (1999) (“[W]ho will speak or listen when this behavior leaves  
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that accessing democratic forums on the Internet creates a 
traceable digital trail, “merely listening on the Internet be-
comes a speech-act.”149 In this way, data-mining of political in-
formation can compromise self-government while falling under 
First Amendment protection. Political data-mining can also de-
tract from voter autonomy when “[i]ts perfected surveillance of 
naked thought’s digital expression short-circuits the individu-
al’s own process of decisionmaking.”150 
A. PAST ATTEMPTS TO PROTECT VOTER PRIVACY 
If privacy is defined as the “claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to 
what extent information about them is communicated to oth-
ers,”151 then existing law fails to protect the privacy of individ-
uals from political data-mining. Citizens lose sight of bits of da-
ta gleaned from consumer transactions, campaign 
contributions, and government documents once that data comes 
into the possession of other parties to a transaction.152 Citizens 
have limited control at best over what third parties gain access 
to their information.153 Aggregation of data from various 
sources provides data-miners with a fuller picture of an indi-
vidual than they intend to reveal.154 When an individual buys a 
car, he does not expect that transaction to lead to a political 
consultant categorizing him as a particular type of voter likely 
to be susceptible to a certain political ad.155 
1. Existing Law Does Not Protect Data Privacy 
The four privacy torts appear inadequate to deal with 
technology-driven threats to privacy. Intrusion upon seclusion 
protects material of a particularly sensitive nature, not the 
                                                          
finely-grained data trails in a fashion that is difficult to understand or antici-
pate?”). 
 149. Id. at 1652. 
 150. Id. at 1656. 
 151. WESTIN, supra note 21, at 7. 
 152. See Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 506–07. 
 153. See id. 
 154. See Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 507 (“Aggregation upsets the-
se expectations, because it involves the combination of data in new, potentially 
unanticipated ways to reveal facts about a person that are not readily 
known.”). 
 155. See, e.g., Graff, supra note 5, at 41 (“Jaguar, Land Rover, and Porsche 
owners tend to be more Republican, while Subaru, Hyundai, and Volvo drivers 
lean Democratic.”). 
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seemingly mundane and often public details of consumer 
transactions.156 Public disclosure of private facts also protects 
only information that would be “highly offensive,” and the sale 
of data between private databases does not rise to a sufficient 
level of publicity.157 False light publicity protects only against 
reputational harms, not the injuries to autonomy inflicted by 
data-mining.158 Appropriation of name or likeness protects the 
value of an individual’s identity, not the value added from ag-
gregation.159 Statutes intended to protect privacy seem similar-
ly ill equipped to handle high-tech threats to privacy.160 
The approach to protecting voter privacy in the United 
States has been piecemeal and, many would argue, unsuccess-
ful. Two substantial problems stand in the way of voter privacy 
legislation: voter apathy and the First Amendment.161 Most da-
ta compilation occurs by a gradual process of accretion from 
transactions, so the violation of privacy goes unnoticed to the 
individual.162 Consequently, most individuals do not know the 
extent to which they are being profiled. Laws that burden polit-
ical speech must serve a compelling governmental interest and 
be narrowly tailored to serve that interest.163 How restrictive a 
regime can be applied to political data-mining thus depends in 
part on whether the activity of data-miners is speech at all and, 
if so, whether it is commercial speech (which receives limited 
First Amendment protection)164 or political speech (which re-
                                                          
 156. SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 6, at 59 (“[C]ourts have rejected 
intrusion actions based on obtaining a person’s unlisted phone number, selling 
the names of magazine subscribers . . . and collecting and disclosing an indi-
vidual’s past insurance history.”). 
 157. Id. at 59–60. 
 158. Id. at 60. 
 159. Id. at 60–61. 
 160. See supra note 68. 
 161. See, e.g., Howard & Kreiss, supra note 142 (“On First Amendment 
grounds, provided they remain non–state actors candidates and parties enjoy 
broad latitude with respect to their data practices.”); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 
U.S. 514, 534 (2001) (holding “privacy concerns give way when balanced 
against the interest in publishing matters of public importance.”). 
 162. Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 507. 
 163. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010). 
 164. Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980) 
(“The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial speech 
than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”) (citing Ohralik v. Ohio 
State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 456, 457 (1978)). 
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ceives the highest First Amendment protection).165 In the past, 
courts have treated the collection and dissemination of voter 
data by pollsters as political speech, protected under the First 
Amendment.166 Other courts have casually dealt with data as 
speech, relying heavily on a “slippage between images of infor-
mation as speech and as (owned and traded) commodity . . . .”167 
But regulation of other information markets, such as securities, 
intellectual property, and computer crimes, is permissible un-
der the First Amendment.168 Many restrictions on political 
speech have been upheld under strict scrutiny.169 Nevertheless, 
“[p]rivacy rules punishing or preventing the dissemination of 
truthful information have long been perceived as threatening 
core First Amendment values . . . .”170 
2. Theories and Proposals to Protect Data Privacy 
Under a property rights conception of privacy, the key 
question is to whom personal data belongs; operators of data-
bases argue that they “own” the data,171 while some privacy 
advocates argue individuals should be allowed to buy and sell 
their own personal information.172 Another approach would 
seek to maximize the freedom of various actors to choose the 
disposition of their data.173 A third approach argues that “the 
collection and processing of personal data creates knowledge,” 
                                                          
 165. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (“The First Amendment ‘has its full-
est and most urgent application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for polit-
ical office.”) (quoting Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 
214, 223 (1989)). 
 166. E.g., Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Colburg, 699 F. Supp. 241, 242 (D. Mont. 
1988) (“Gathering and dissemination of information concerning why and how 
people vote constitutes speech which is protected by the first amendment.”). 
 167. Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 8, at 1413–14. 
 168. Id. at 1416–17; see also Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethink-
ing Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1653 (2009) 
(discussing the “tension between these two very different First Amendment 
regimes for civil liability” in torts versus contract and property claims). 
 169. E.g., Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court of Pa., 944 F.2d 
137, 139 (3rd Cir. 1991) (upholding prohibitions against judicial candidates 
“announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues” and soliciting 
campaign contributions). 
 170. Richards, supra note 74, at 1119. 
 171. Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 8, at 1378 (“Opponents of 
strengthened privacy protection . . . point to their investment in compiling the 
databases and developing algorithms to “mine” them for various purposes.”). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 1391–92 (“What matters most is that personal data is owned at 
the end of the day in the manner the parties have agreed.”). 
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and marketers armed with this knowledge are better able to 
serve consumers.174 A fourth approach looks at the relationship 
between data and speech, and concludes that privacy “inter-
fere[s] with the speech rights of would-be data-collectors to 
spread any judgments, generalizations, and correlations that 
are salable and not demonstrably false.”175 
The most recent attempts at privacy reform in the United 
States focus on notice and consent—whether individuals “fully 
understand and appreciate what information is being collected 
about them, and whether or not they are empowered to stop 
certain practices from taking place.”176 The Commercial Privacy 
Bill of Rights Act, proposed in April 2011, would create a 
broader privacy law than those currently enacted and allow 
consumers to access data about themselves and block some us-
es of it.177 The White House’s Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights 
establishes a framework for data privacy based on individual 
control, transparency, respect for context, security, access and 
accuracy, focused collection, and accountability.178 This ap-
proach most closely resembles the freedom of choice theory. 
Absent new restrictions on political data-mining, the low 
cost and easy availability of political information such as voter 
registration, voting history, and campaign contributions, may 
actually slow (but not stop) the erosion of privacy. If a cam-
paign can easily access such data through government web-
sites, and then manage the data on increasingly powerful per-
sonal computers with common software such as Excel or 
Access, it might choose to spend more on television buys and 
hire a part-time (or volunteer) in-house data manager to query 
the data for likely voters and donors rather than hiring a data 
firm. A campaign could potentially hand the job of downloading 
                                                          
 174. Id. at 1402. 
 175. Id. at 1409. 
 176. Consumer Online Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 
Sci. and Transp., 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Sen. John D. Rockefeller 
IV, Chairman, S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp.), available at 
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Hearings&ContentRecord_id=
0bfb9dfc-bbd7-40d6-8467-3b3344c72235&Statement_id=21f3326d-345f-4aaa-
b105-0532997b481e&ContentType_id=14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d35-56cc7152a7ed 
&Group_id=b06c39af-e033-4cba-9221-de668ca1978a&MonthDisplay=7&Year 
Display=2010 (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). 
 177. Julia Angwin, Senators Offer Privacy Bill to Protect Personal Data, 
WALL ST. J, April 13, 2011, at B1. 
 178. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 72, at 47–48. 
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voter rolls and campaign finance reports to a volunteer and not 
even bother raising the money that would have been spent on a 
data firm. The candidate might spend less time in the call room 
raising money and more time on voter contact. The mark-up for 
data consultants may decrease along with the demand for their 
services. Unregulated, the political information trade could 
cease to be so lucrative as it becomes democratized.179 Still, the 
aggregation of consumer data with political data would remain 
a powerful tool—especially for statewide and federal cam-
paigns. However, easy access to political data means more 
campaigns have the opportunity to breach voter privacy.180 
Some proposed remedies to political data protection prob-
lems are overly restrictive, under-protective, or both. Johnson 
et al. recommend making donor data “read only” to increase the 
cost of importing such data into political databases.181 This 
would seem to only bar outsider candidates with limited re-
sources from using the data, while professional political data-
miners will quickly find a way to work around the nuisance—
making their service even more valuable.182 They also propose 
limiting the lifespan of contributor data, but again, professional 
data-miners could quickly find a work-around and mark-up the 
cost of their services. One possibility for reform would be to 
prohibit the processing of data revealing political beliefs, as the 
EU directive does.183 Such an approach may or may not be 
permissible under the First Amendment.184 But a broad prohi-
bition would foreclose the benefits of political data-mining, 
                                                          
 179. Cf. Hardy, supra note 93 (remarking that “Big Data” is a big business 
with “an uncountable number of data-mining startups in the field”). 
 180. Further, a Senator in Washington, D.C. likely has less interest in an 
individual’s political leanings than does a  city councilperson next door. Access 
to political information by personal acquaintances may actually have a greater 
impact on an individual’s life than access by a national political figure. 
 181. Deborah G. Johnson, et al., Campaign Disclosure, Privacy, and Trans-
parency, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 959, 980 (2011). 
 182. Part of Aristotle’s appeal for many years has been its data gathered 
from hard-to-get public sources, “located on ledgers or computers in town 
halls, state office buildings or county courthouses, each with different hours 
and different rules of access.” Wayne, supra note 7, A10. 
 183. EU DIRECTIVE, supra note 76, at art. 8 (“Member States shall prohibit 
the processing of personal data revealing . . . political opinions . . . .”). The Di-
rective goes on to carve out exceptions, including one for non-profits with polit-
ical purposes. Id. 
 184. See Solove & Richards, supra note 168, at 1652–53 (discussing the du-
ality of the law’s approach to civil liability when the First Amendment is im-
plicated). 
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namely increasing voter turnout. Mandatory disclosure of data-
mining activities would be a narrower approach to protecting 
voter autonomy. 
B. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE TO PROTECT VOTER AUTONOMY 
A successful voter privacy policy must satisfy three general 
privacy constraints: (1) balancing free speech with ownership, 
(2) providing meaningful notice and consent, and (3) holding 
data-miners accountable to individuals and society.185 The ul-
timate goal must be to preserve intellectual “breathing room” in 
which voters can autonomously make political choices.186 
1. Requiring Campaigns to Disclose Voter Profiles to Individual 
Voters 
Campaigns should be required to disclose their data-
mining activity. Additionally, voters should be allowed to re-
quest their own profile from federal-level campaigns, and cam-
paigns should have to disclose their use of outside databases. 
Voters should then be allowed to choose to opt out of profiling. 
However voters would not be permitted to opt out of receiving 
political ads. This approach would create only a minimal bur-
den (if any) on campaign speech, while protecting the property 
rights of both individuals and data-miners. It would give ade-
quate notice and opportunity for consent to voters, and it would 
bring political data-mining into public view, where voters and 
consumers would be better situated to hold data-miners ac-
countable. 
2. Constitutionality of Disclosure 
The highest legal hurdle for any proposal to reform voter 
privacy is the First Amendment. Political speech is core pro-
tected speech under the First Amendment, and laws limiting 
such speech must be able to withstand strict scrutiny by 
courts.187 To do so, the law must “further[] a compelling inter-
                                                          
 185. Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 8, at 1428. 
 186. Richards, supra note 74, at 1120 (“By protecting sheltered intellectual 
exploration and the processes by which opinions and ideas are generated, data 
privacy rules create expressive breathing room and intellectual autonomy and 
could themselves be viewed as having First Amendment magnitude.”). 
 187. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (“[P]olitical speech must prevail 
against laws that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence.”). 
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est and [be] narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”188 A 
proposal that instead limits commercial speech would undergo 
less exacting scrutiny under the Central Hudson test.189 Any 
limitation on commercial speech must directly advance a sub-
stantial government interest by means no more expansive than 
necessary.190 A proposal that does not limit speech will not in-
voke First Amendment protections. 
A voter profile disclosure law could survive strict scrutiny, 
so the question of what type of speech it restricts is moot. The 
compelling government interest advanced by the proposal is 
voter privacy. The D.C. Circuit Court found the FEC’s prohibi-
tion on use of contribution data for fundraising purposes to 
serve an important government interest, but the interest was 
in the value of the donor list to the campaign, not in the privacy 
of the donors.191 Nevertheless, voter privacy and autonomy 
would likely be perceived as compelling government interests. 
Disclosure advances the interest by revealing the sources of the 
voter’s data trail. The opt-out provision would protect privacy 
by giving voters control over their own personal information. To 
determine whether the disclosure of profile data is narrowly 
tailored, courts will examine whether the law restricts speech 
no more than necessary to advance its interests. The Supreme 
Court has found that “[d]isclaimer and disclosure requirements 
may burden the ability to speak, but they ‘impose no ceiling on 
campaign-related activities,’ and ‘do not prevent anyone from 
speaking.’”192 This disclosure requirement would place minimal 
burdens on a campaign’s speech; to satisfy the disclosure re-
quirement, all a campaign would need is an interface on its 
website for voters to enter their name and address (or perhaps 
a more secure username and password) to view their own digi-
tal dossier. The log-in procedure would make mining data from 
the interface too burdensome for other data-miners to ex-
                                                          
 188. Federal Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 
449, 464 (2007). 
 189. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562–63 (“The Constitution therefore ac-
cords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally 
guaranteed expression.”). 
 190. Id. at 564 (“The State must assert a substantial interest . . . the re-
striction must directly advance the state interest,” and “if the governmental 
interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial 
speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.”). 
 191. Johnson et al., supra note 181, at 966 (2011). 
 192. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (2010) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1 at 64 (1976) and McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 at 201 (2003)). 
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ploit,193 so private data-miners’ business would be protected. 
Further, the Court favors opt-out provisions over opt-in.194 
More restrictive means of protecting privacy are imaginable but 
may be impermissible under the First Amendment; banning 
some or all political data-mining would seriously impede 
speech, as would an opt-in provision. 
3. Application 
To be effective, the disclosure requirement would have to 
apply to campaigns at both the state and federal level, includ-
ing PACs and groups campaigning for referendums. At the 
same time, placing burdens on low-visibility state and local 
races could deter cash-strapped candidates from entering races, 
so the requirement should only apply above a threshold spend-
ing level. The provision could be adopted either as part of gen-
eral election law, or it could be made a condition of accepting 
public campaign financing. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
When a citizen’s privacy is breached by political data-
mining, there is typically no villain behind the act.195 Politi-
cians hire data firms to win elections, so data consultants are 
in fact playing a positive role in public service: by identifying 
voting patterns based on consumer data, campaigns can appeal 
to individuals who have not previously voted, thereby increas-
ing voter turnout.196 With no clear tortfeasor, fighting breaches 
of privacy is nearly impossible. Nevertheless, the privacy inter-
                                                          
 193. Unlike the protections envisioned by Johnson et al., voters would only 
be able to view one record at a time—their own. Cf. Johnson et al., supra note 
181, at 978. 
 194. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, (1997). See also Co-
hen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (noting bystanders to offensive speech 
could opt out “simply by averting their eyes”) “The ability of government, con-
sonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from 
hearing it is, in other words, dependent upon a showing that substantial pri-
vacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.” Id. By 
not permitting voters to opt out of receiving political advertisements, the law 
skirts a First Amendment challenge to restricting political advertising. 
 195. Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 559 (“In many instances, there is 
no clear-cut wrongdoer, no indisputable villain whose activities lack social 
value.”). 
 196. See Kreiss, supra note 143, at 72 (“The Obama campaign targeted pri-
ority individuals residing in heavily Republican districts, and focused on 
neighborhoods with low voter turnout but high numbers of likely supporters.”). 
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ests of citizens must be balanced against other valid rights and 
not simply dismissed. First Amendment protections are them-
selves driven partly by concerns over autonomy and self-
government—the same concerns underlying the right to priva-
cy. Personally identifiable data is now being constantly record-
ed and used in remarkable ways that can increase efficiency for 
vendors, decrease the cost of running an effective campaign for 
political candidates, and connect voters with candidates who 
suit their tastes and preferences. Political data-mining comes 
with economic and social benefits, and suppressing information 
collection would be onerous and counterproductive. Adhering to 
the principles of the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, voter pri-
vacy remedies should acknowledge the value of political data-
mining and focus on empowering voters to exercise control over 
their personal information. 
 
